Deliberation may be used by organizations or networks of organizations to manage the moral and technical uncertainties that are associated with "threshold strategies" --that is, strategies whose superiority over alternatives is unclear. Much academic literature underestimates the importance of deliberation, largely because of its reliance on paradigms that view organizational life as though it were mechanistic or game-like. A new heuristic, based on the metaphor of organizations as assemblies, is proposed. The experience of Ontario's food bank community is used to illustrate how deliberation is used to manage threshold strategies. The paper discusses some difficulties in promoting deliberation.
INTRODUCTION
Ontario's food bank system grew rapidly after the establishment of the first food bank in Toronto in 1982. By the early 1990s, however, many workers within the system had strong doubts about the wisdom of a strategy aimed at helping lower-income individuals through emergency food relief. Some suggested that the system did harm to recipients by giving governments an excuse to delay social assistance reforms that would reduce the need for emergency food relief. These growing doubts suffused the food bank system's daily work: few operational decisions could be taken until this larger question --whether the community is doing good or doing harm --was resolved.
This paper examines how the food bank community responded to growing doubts about the rightness of its work. The immediate response of various members of the community was to engage one another in deliberation about the moral and technical issues that confronted them in daily practice.
The construction of opportunities for such deliberation, and the management of debate itself, became one of the central tasks for leaders in the food bank system. It is through this sort of deliberation that doubt about strategy is dispelled, or made tolerable, so that individuals are able to make operating decisions.
Although the management of deliberation is a critically important task, it has received limited attention in the management literature. The literature on non-profit and voluntary organizations emphasizes technical problems in budgeting, fundraising, and operations management; and even the literature on strategic planning assigns limited importance to the task of deliberation. More generally, the management literature is characterized by a failure to take deliberation seriously, relying instead on an approach to collective activity in which interpersonal relations are regarded as a game, in which each side attempts to advance their own interests, rather than as a discussion, in which actors seek to reason with one another about goals and tactics. This paper proposes an alternative paradigm, which places emphasis on the process of deliberation within organizations.
When we use this paradigm to analyze collective activity, we see that one of the most important tasks of organizational leaders consists of the construction and management of opportunities for debate. The paper outlines some of the obstacles that have confronted leaders in the food bank community as they have set about these tasks.
DOUBTS ABOUT A "THRESHOLD STRATEGY"
Ontario's food bank system is, as a recent government report says, "one of the province's few growth industries." 1 In 1981 there were no food banks in Canada.
Over the next ten years, a combination of forces --recession and economic restructuring, escalation of living costs in urban areas, erosion of minimum wage standards and a decline in the real value of social assistance payments --drove more and more people to rely on emergency food relief services. By 1992, there were almost four hundred food banks registered with the Canadian Association of Food Banks (CAFB). The CAFB estimated that 2.3 million Canadians received assistance from a food bank at least once in 1992. Children accounted for roughly forty percent of the client population. 2 The rate of food bank usage was higher in Ontario than in any other province. In Toronto alone, there were about 250 "frontline" agencies delivering food relief. These were supported by three major collection and distribution agencies. The largest of these, the Daily Bread Food Bank, had a paid staff of ten, a volunteer staff of five hundred, and annually collected and distributed ten million pounds of food to over two hundred frontline agencies. A second warehouse agency, the North York Harvest Food Bank, had a paid staff of four, a volunteer staff of fifty, and annually distributed one million pounds of food to thirty-five suburban front-line agencies. 3 A third agency, the Second Harvest Food Support Committee, relied on fifty volunteers to collect perishable foods from hotels, restaurants and grocery stores and distribute it to seventy-five drop-in centers, shelters and soup kitchens around Toronto. 4 Every year, the food bank system ran three highly publicized food drives --at Easter, Thanksgiving, and Christmas --and hundreds of smaller food drives, sponsored by churches, schools, businesses, and community groups.
In its early years, workers within the food bank community could easily justify their work. The most powerful argument in favor of expanding the food bank system was that it provided immediate help to a population that could not afford to feed itself, at least for a few days every month. But there were also other compelling arguments in favor of food banks. Some argued that food banks provided "friendly human contact" to individuals who were otherwise lost in the impersonal welfare bureaucracy. 5 The system was also said to be an important instrument for civic education on hunger and poverty issues. Activities such as food drives would help to keep such issues on the public agenda 6 ; while volunteer service in food banks themselves would "[put] people in a position to see injustices to which they otherwise might not have been exposed." 7 More broadly, it was argued that the food bank system would demonstrate the power of voluntarism, and remind the public of its duty to care for the less fortunate, which would in turn generate good works in many other areas. 8
With the passage of time, and with the rapid expansion of the system in the recent recession, the arguments against this approach to hunger relief became clearer and more compelling. For example, the system itself was highly unstable. Because it relied so much on the voluntary contribution of resources, it was, as a 1990 government report observed, constantly "at risk of collapse." 9 ("Donor fatigue," and burnout among the volunteers who staff front-line agencies, were the most significant sources of instability.) The food bank system is also grossly inefficient, because it often involves the conveyance of food through the normal retail system to a consumer, to a collection site, to a frontline agency, and finally to a second consumer. 10 The benefit provided by the food bank system is also limited, since the food provided includes a high proportion of stale-dated or damaged goods, and few of the more costly but nutritionally important goods, such as meat, fish and dairy products.
Another problem was the inability to find a satisfactory method for rationing food among clients. Frontline agencies were reluctant to apply means tests, because they are demeaning and inconsistent with their charitable intentions 11 ; on the other hand, the arbitrary rules that were used in place of means tests --such as limiting hours of service, or the area served, or the amount of food in individual hampers --were not satisfactory either. Critics also complained that even without means tests, the food bank system degrades its clients and takes unfair advantage of the volunteers who keep it running. 12 Perhaps the most serious criticism made against food banks was that they reduced the likelihood that governments would undertake the social and economic reforms --particularly reforms of the social assistance system --that would eliminate the need for food banks. One activitist worried that food bank volunteers have become the "dupes of government" --unwitting soldiers in the battle led by conservative forces to renegotiate the "social minimum" that the state is obligated to provide to its neediest citizens. 13 Critics argued that food banks stalled reform by allowing donors and volunteers to believe that they have "done their duty" toward the poor, and by diverting the energy of those people who were most likely to lobby for reform into day-to-day operational problems. 14 Prospective advocates were also constrained by the risk that overtly political advocacy will alienate key supporters of the food bank system, such as corporate donors and the media 15 ; and by the need to suppress recipients' anger at their dependence on the food bank system and present the image of a grateful clientele.
Concerns such as these dogged organizers within the food bank system since its inception. In many minds, the approach of helping the poor through emergency food relief was always a threshold strategy --one for which the arguments in favor of it were only marginally more powerful than the arguments against. But the passage of years magnified this doubt substantially. "In the first month we were open, we gave food to fifteen people, and we knew we were doing Jesus' work," one volunteer said. "But now we serve a thousand people every month, and it doesn't seem so simple anymore." 16 "It all seemed very logical to me," another observed:
There's need over there and food being wasted over here, so you just move it. . . . [ This doubt pervaded daily practice in the food bank system. The smallest operating decision had strategic implications and thus raised the broad question of whether the current strategy was a wise one. For example: A community group calls a warehouse, wanting to set up a new food cupboard --but should the warehouse go along with the expansion of its distribution system, or urge the church group to pursue some other activity? The operations of a food bank would be improved by hiring one or two full-time staff, or by leasing a better building, or by buying a computer --but should the food bank "institutionalize" itself in this way? Similarly, demand could be made more manageable by rationalizing the service boundaries of front-line agencies, and adopting new rules for rationing scarce food to clients --but is it right for a charity to do this? A government ministry offers money to a front-line agency so that it can buy food to meet demand --but what are the symbolic implications if the agency takes the money? All of these operational questions draw food bank organizers back to broad question of the wisdom of the food bank strategy, and none can be resolved unless some method of addressing the moral and technical uncertainties about the strategy can be found.
HOW THE FOOD BANK COMMUNITY RESPONDED
The main instrument which people in the food bank community used to manage this growing doubt about the wisdom of the emergency food relief strategy was not surprising: It was talk. The immediate product of the moral and technical uncertainties which afflicted the food bank system was a great debate about the right way to handle day-to-day decisions, and about the broad strategy implicit in those decisions. This debate was the means by which individuals sorted out their opinion about the rightness of the broad strategy, and thus liberated themselves from the operational paralysis that doubt would otherwise create.
Many observers noted how intense the debate had become by the early 1990s. One commentator found "sharp and agonizing dissent developing within the food bank community" about the emergency food relief strategy:
Formerly dewy-eyed volunteers speak of internecine squabbles on their boards. . . . The inability of food banks to cope with the root problem --that nothing is being done to attack the causes of hunger --has forced them to look for solutions beyond their original mandate of providing direct food aid. This has created more dissent. One camp argues that food banks have a social and ethical responsibility to put themselves out of business; another, that working toward establishing a permanent presence as an intermediary between government and business is a more realistic response. 20
The food bank community was now "grappling with a crisis of conscience," another observer suggested. 21 A third found that there was "heat steaming through the foodbank movement on the shutdown issue." 22
Deliberations over basic strategic questions became more intense as governments moved to provide more support for the new food bank network. The Ontario government began offering financial aid to food banks during 1982 recession, thus creating for individual agencies the question of whether to accept that assistance.
Some said not, arguing that it permitted the government to delay reforms; others, doubting that the government would proceed with reforms in any case, said that food banks should take the money. The debate between these two positions became more public in 1988, during hearings of a special governmental commission on welfare reform, whose report ultimately recommended against continuation of financial assistance 23 ; flared again during legislative committee hearings in March, 1990, after the province stopped the assistance program 24 ; and gained wide media coverage in November, 1990, when a newly-elected NDP government reversed policy and reintroduced financial assistance. 25
Other proposals for government support also fueled debate. For example, members of the Canadian Association of Food Banks have spent much of the past year considering whether to approve "Milk Aid," a proposal by the Dairy Farmers of Canada in which governments would have purchased surplus milk production and distributed it to food banks. Some food banks saw the proposal as an instrument for improving the inadequate supply of dairy products, while others worried that it would create a system with an interest in maintaining a poor clientele. The CAFB voted tentatively in favor of the proposal in 1991 but rejected it at its 1992 meeting. 26
Meanwhile, a debate was stirring in Ontario over the desirability of proposed "good samaritan" legislation that would limit liability for harm incurred by consumers of perishable food donated by food growers or processors. The Second Harvest Food Support Committee had proposed such legislation in February, 1992, arguing that it would "increase the perishable food that could be recovered for the benefit of the community," and for several months a committee of bureaucrats, industry and food bank representatives discussed what draft legislation might look like. 27 But doubts soon emerged within the food bank community about the desirability of the legislation, with some groups arguing that it would "perpetuate a charity-based response to poverty." 28 Leaders of the food bank community soon began constructing formal opportunities for members of the food bank community to debate basic strategic questions. The North York Harvest Food Bank organized a series of "vision days" --"a series of working forums collectively involving board members and staff that examined the organization's short term and long term objectives." 29 The Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Food and Shelter Advisory Committee organized a one-day "brainstorming session" for its membership. The Anglican Diocese of Toronto, worried about the burden created by food banks run by its congregations, set up a task force to serve as a "tool for creative dialogue" within the food bank community, and held two conferences to "provide a forum . . . to express concerns and thoughts about food banks" 30 The growth of organizations such as the Ontario Association of Food Banks, the Canadian Association of Food Banks, and the Toronto Food Policy Council, while often justified on the grounds of the need to "coordinate action" or to "develop a common front" in its relations with government, also provided a forum for "brainstorming" and "open dialogue" on the moral and technical uncertainties inherent in the food bank strategy. 31
Deliberations over wisdom of the emergency food relief strategy were not limited to formal settings such as meetings of agency boards, or association executives, or coordinative councils. They suffused the whole of the food bank system. Spontaneous discussions broke out constantly as workers wrestled with the moral and technical uncertainties that are imbedded in their daily routine. "Every day is like a vision exercise," David Northcott, President of the CAFB, said in 1992:
We ask ourselves every day if what we are doing is good. Every time one of our volunteers gets a phone call from someone who needs food, and goes through the check list of questions about their situation, the issue comes up: Is what we are doing really the best response to their problem? We talk about this all the time. 32
Author Cary Fagan describes one of these "on the spot" deliberations at a meeting of the Roomers' Association --a support group for people living in rooming houses in downtown Toronto:
The most vocal discussion of the evening centers on the food bank that ends every Roomers meeting, when plastic bags are given out and members line up at the tables stacked with cans of fruit and bags of bread. Some people are showing up near the end of meetings just so they can take from the food bank and often they hog the best items. How can the Roomers make sure distribution is fair?
Somebody suggests filling the bags before each meeting. Michael [a community worker] doesn't like that idea --too much like giving out "goodie bags" to kids rather than letting everyone choose for himself. The young man sitting next to me makes a suggestion . . . . "I was just down in San Francisco," he says, " and for their food banks everybody gets issued ID cards with photographs." Tammie [another community worker] doesn't like that idea. "You people have to jump through too many hoops as it is," she says. She and the other workers are eager to keep the system open, democratic, and based on mutual trust, but the Roomers themselves don't seem nearly as concerned about such principles and the discussion fades away without a decision. 33
It might be tempting to discount the importance of this conversation; it seems, at first, to change nothing. But this talk does serve an important function even if the operating decision --the choice of methods for rationing food --goes unchanged. The fact that Michael and Tammie engage one another in discussion about the right way of rationing food is evidence that in their own minds they are unsure about what the right way really is. They show themselves to be open to argument, which is another way of saying that neither party is so confident of their position that that they will not listen to arguments against it. The talk itself is a means for dispelling that doubt: it allows for an exploration of the ethical and technical problems that must be resolved in the course of making decisions about rationing. It reveals a wider range of considerations than might have occurred to any one person, reflecting about the problem alone; and allows a search for new approaches --the ID cards used in San Francisco --that might have been unknown previously. While the operating decision goes unchanged, for now, it might be that deliberations such as this, accumulating over days or weeks, will produce a change later on; and furthermore we know that the deliberative capacity of individual actors --their ability to reason competently about this and analogous issues --has probably improved; and correspondingly the odds that they will be frozen by their inability to make reasoned operating decisions is diminished.
The same function may have been served by all of the large and small deliberations that arose throughout the food bank system. The deliberations are spawned by pervasive doubt about the right way of solving day-to-day problems; a severe degree of dread about making the wrong decision 34 ; and a sense of the frailty of individual reason as an instrument for problem-solving. Workers in the food bank community sought to manage this doubt by engaging other workers in deliberation --a collective process in which the arguments that can be marshalled in favor of contending positions can be identified and weighed, and judgements made about the position that seems to be supported by the strongest reasons. This collective deliberation is a remedy for the weakness of individual reason.
As Peter Senge argues, it "reveals incoherence in our thought" and permits individuals to "gain insights that simply could not be achieved individually. " 35 Furthermore it frees individual workers from the dread which might otherwise cripple their ability to actually make decisions on complex problems.
WHY WE OVERLOOK DELIBERATION
Although practitioners invest a lot of time in the construction and management of opportunities for deliberation, it is not something that gets much attention in the academic literature on management. It is probably fair to say that the importance of deliberation as a tool for managing moral and technical uncertainty has gone generally unrecognized. Instead, we tend to regard such uncertainty as something that is tackled as a solitary exercise, and have therefore concentrated on developing techniques which individual decision-makers can use to structure and resolve problems of uncertainty. This includes techniques in the field of decision analysis, such as those provided in Stokey 36 Without denying the value of this work, its utility would be increased if it recognized that such problems are almost always resolved through deliberations with others, and if it consequently provided advice on how these deliberations should be structured. If they are to be applied in practice, these methods of analysis must comprehend procedural, as well as substantive questions, and by-and-large they do not do this at the moment.
An argument might be made that the task of managing deliberation is addressed within the literature on strategic planning. Mason and Mitroff, for example, provide advice on the structuring of "dialectical debates" within strategic planning groups 37 ; and the idea of using planning groups as fora for deliberation on questions of strategy is also discussed by Bryson 38 and Nutt and Backoff. 39 Anne Huff has also noted the importance of deliberation as an instrument for "coping with ambiguity and change." Change is always accompanied by widespread debate, Huff says:
The most important reason why this is true is that individuals and groups usually need to gain the support of others in order to promote their views, protect their interests, and obtain new benefits. Thus they are motivated to present their arguments in the broadest possible light, showing, if possible, how the actions they support will benefit a larger number of constituents. . . . This industrious cognitive activity is balanced by the activities of others in the organization whose self-perceived interests motivate them to support alternative actions. . . . The result is a review and modification of ideas for action which draws upon the diverse ability and skills of many players in the organization, rather than upon the abilities of the few at the top of the organization. 40
Similarly, V.K. Narayanan and Liam Fahey suggest that debate is an unavoidable part of the strategy-making process, which emerges as coalitions within an organization use arguments as "gambits" in their negotiations with other coalitions. 41
There are two lines of criticism that can be advanced about the approach toward deliberation that is taken in the strategic planning literature. The first is that the role which it assigns to deliberation is often a very small one, limited in time (to the duration of the planning exercise) and in numbers (to the persons included in the strategic planning group). We know, however, that there is much more deliberation than this going on in most organizations. Deliberation almost has a life of its own, spilling into every part of the organization, and persisting even after formal planning processes have expired; and this literature does not explain how to manage all of this activity.
The second criticism is that the strategic planning literature often tends to take a very shallow view of deliberation. Debate is not regarded as something that begins because people seek help in managing their own uncertainties, but as a means by which actors who are certain of their goals seek to exert control over others. Argumentation is almost seen as a façade, behind which individuals hide their own material interests. This is very much the approach taken by Huff, Narayanan and Fahey. Arguments themselves are "gambits," or ruses; indeed the whole conversation might be construed as a thin veil over interactions that might be better described as a play of power. The idea that individuals might enter into a conversation because they are uncertain of their interests, or that they might change their understanding of their interests in the course of the conversation, is really not appreciated.
In short, there are two defects in the management literature's treatment of deliberation: a tendency to overlook it, on the assumption that important decisions are made by solitary decisionmakers, or at least small groups of decision-makers; and a tendency not to take deliberation seriously, but as a veil over a cruder play of power by competing interests. These tendencies persist because of our reliance on two paradigms for understanding collective activity, which may be called the "machine paradigm" and the "game paradigm." The weaknesses of these two paradigms can be remedied by adopting a third heuristic device --the assembly paradigm --which remedies the weakness of the machine and game paradigms by giving greater emphasis to deliberative activities.
The Machine Paradigm
As the name suggests, the machine paradigm is a framework for comprehending organizational activity which builds on a root metaphor that identifies organizations with machines. 42 Organizations, like machines, are therefore regarded as instruments that are built to produce certain outputs; which may be efficient or inefficient in producing those outputs; which have well-defined components, whose interactions with one another are smooth and routinized; and which are run through "control devices" by a small number of operators. 43 Much early thinking about management was dominated by this metaphor.
When we use the machine paradigm to structure our understanding of collective activity we are more likely to view strategy-making as something that is done by a very small of individuals --or perhaps only one individual --in isolation from the hundreds or thousands of other people who live in the organization. "Planning," "decision-making," and "controlling" are tasks that are accomplished by managers alone, although it might sometime be based on "information" that is gathered from subordinate units. 44 Judith Shklar calls this the "decisionist" view of policy-making: "the vision of a limited number of political actors engaged in making calculated choices among clearly conceived alternatives." 45 The decisionist perspective is an unavoidable entailment of the machine paradigm: because after all machines cannot think --only their operators can.
It follows that when we apply the machine paradigm we tend to neglect the importance of deliberation among the constituents of an organization. There is very little "talk" or "debate" in this paradigm. Interaction between the parts of an organization is understood as "information exchange," or "command," but not as conversation --a loosely-structured exchange between reasoning actors. If there is deliberation about strategy, it is undertaken by the executive alone, or by a relatively small group of operators; and it follows from this that advice on the handling of complex problems will place greater emphasis on methods of formal analysis, and less on the procedural questions of how to construct and manage opportunities for debate. Certainly the ability to manage deliberation is not regarded as a central managerial skill: instead emphasis is given to tasks such as the planning of work, the organization of resources, the issuing of directives to subordinates, and so on. 46
The Game Paradigm
One of the major limitations of the machine paradigm is the weakness of its characterization of the relations between individuals within an organization. It is obvious that these relations consist of more than the transmission of commands or "information."
Subordinates protest commands, or demand explanations, or simply refuse to comply, or fight with one another over goals and for resources. None of this activity can be adequately explained within the machine paradigm, because a proper explanation requires that we attribute volition to the parts of a machine, and it is difficult to imagine a machine in which the parts think and fight with one another.
Consequently, we have developed a new paradigm, which is now the most commonly-used framework for comprehending collective activity. It is based on the metaphor of collective activity as a game. When we adopt the game paradigm, we comprehend each organization as a group of players, each with well-defined goals, and each playing in a way that seems likely to advance their position and thus win the game. The language of the game paradigm is pervasive: as when we talk about the "rules of the game" in a particular organization, or ask "what is at stake" in a conflict, or assert that someone has "gambled everything" or "played for keeps," or suggest that someone will "win this round, but lose the next." The paradigm is implicit in Allison's "bureaucratic politics" model 47 ; but it may also be found in many other places: in recent economic theories of organization 48 ; in the literature on negotiation, built in turn on game theory 49 ; as well as many academic and non-academic works on the "politics" of organizational life. 50
The game paradigm allows us to develop a more complex model of the strategy-making process than is permitted by the machine paradigm. Here we conceive of strategy as the product of a struggle between players with conflicting interests. The conflict is managed through negotiation or "wheeling and dealing," in which each player attempts to alter the other player's perception of payoffs from various actions by making threats or offering inducements. It follows that each player's ability to win a round of play depends on his or her power, which might be roughly defined as the capacity to make threats or offer inducements. Such conflict is often resolved with implicit or explicit "deals" or contracts. On its own, these bargain may seem unreasoned or incoherent; in fact, they are best understood as "resultants," whose substance is a function of the relative power of the two parties.
The game paradigm may present a better-rounded view of collective activity than that provided by the machine paradigm, but it still diminishes the importance of deliberation between members of an community. In part, deliberation is neglected because the paradigm assumes that the goals of individual players are predetermined and stable. If we assume that interests are "given," then we eliminate the main reason for wanting to deliberate with other players --to determine what one's interests should be. And in part, deliberation is neglected because of the assumption that players will be ruthless in the pursuit of their own interest --so that they will not engage in a cooperative effort in reasoning if it impinges on the advancement of their own goals. For whatever reason, deliberation is given scant attention in the game paradigm: the exchange of argument and counter-argument is counted as only one of several negotiating tactics, and as one that distracts attention from the "real" issues, which are better understood as being rooted in the need to distribute scarce resources between players with conflicting goals.
Furthermore, managers are not expected to give much attention to the management of discussion itself. If one adopts the game paradigm, the key managerial skills are those of "power politics." As Jeffrey Pfeffer explains:
The first step is to decide on your goals. . . . Once you have a goal in mind, it is necessary to diagnose who is important in getting your goal accomplished. . . . [I] t is important to ascertain the power bases of the other players, as well as your own potential and actual sources of power. In this way, you can determine your relative strength. Finally, you will want to consider carefully the various strategies or tactics available to you. . . . These tactics help in using power and influence effectively. 51 Pfeffer's characterization of the managerial function is hardly idiosyncratic. As we can see, it is based explicitly on the game paradigm, and consequently it gives no attention to the role of deliberation within the organization, and certainly does not define the manager's job as a matter of cultivating deliberation.
The Assembly Paradigm
Giandomenico Majone observes: "We miss a great deal if we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of debate and argument." 52 Yet it will be difficult to give more attention to debate and argument if we continue to use the machine or game paradigms to structure our understanding of collective activity, because neither is hospitable to such deliberation. One ignores it and the other reduces it to a cruder form of interaction. The best way to account for debate and argument is to adopt a new metaphor and build upon it a new paradigm for comprehending collective activity.
One such metaphor would be one that identitified collective enterprises with assemblies. By an "assembly" I mean a group that is gathered for the purpose of deliberating and deciding upon some practical question. Activity within an assembly consists of debate over this question: individuals present arguments in favor of one view, and hear counter-arguments which point to weaknesses in their reasoning or which favor alternative views. The model I have in mind is the Assembly of Ancient Athens. The Assembly, Josiah Ober says, . . . [was] the key decision-making body of the Athenian state. . . . Open to all citizens, the Assembly met frequently to debate and to decide state policy. Any citizen who could gain and hold the attention of his fellows in the Assembly had the right to advise them on national policy. As Plato put it, "Anyone may stand up and offer advice, whether he be a carpenter, a blacksmith, a shoemaker, a merchant, a ship captain, wealthy, poor, noble or base-born . . ." [Through the Assembly,] the demos . . . was master of Athens. 53
A reference to Ancient Greece may seem peculiar. But the image that comes to mind when we use this metaphor is appealing. Imagine the food bank community, or any other collectivity, as the demos, engaged in some grand debate over strategy, punctuated now and then with decisions on concrete questions, but rolling on even after decisions are taken, and often spilling out of the assembly into the routine of daily work. Individuals use this deliberation to measure the reasonableness of their own opinions; to determine whether others have good reasons for their opinions, and more fundamentally to clarify what "good reasons" are. The subject of deliberation may range widely, including debate about the mission of the organization, the choice of programs to accomplish that mission, the roles and obligations of various actors within the organization, relations with external agencies, and so on. There are, furthermore, norms within the community which we can characterize as "rules of debate": some of which determine who has standing to speak on a particular issue, some of which oblige individuals to "listen to reason" or be "open to argument," and some of which dictate what will count as a "good reason" for preferring one position over another. 54
This metaphor also leads us to an understanding of the managerial function that is very different than that produced by the machine or game paradigms. Managers do not merely operate control devices, or negotiate coalitions, but orchestrate conversation. They are very much like the Council chosen by lot from the demos to organize the Assembly's business: managers set agendas, put forward policies for deliberation, and ensure that the rules of debate are adhered to. They regulate the flow of debate, by probing for and clarifying areas of disagreement, and ensuring that alternative positions are clearly articulated. 55 They call for votes and report results. And just as the Assembly's Council was responsible for the maintenance of the theatre in which the Assembly held its meetings, the manager is responsible for building and maintaining fora for deliberation --although the fora for contemporary debates may rely less on face-to-face communication and more on print and electronic channels.
OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE DELIBERATION
When we apply the assembly paradigm, the central management function is understood to be the construction and management of opportunities for deliberation. For managers, the challenge is to make these tasks the object of "systemic effort and disciplined practice." 56 Academics can help by identifying some of the obstacles which make mastery of these tasks difficult. The experience of the Ontario food bank community provides some clues.
Lack of Fora for Deliberation
While conducting interviews for this paper, the researcher spoke with many individuals who were unaware of positions taken by other organizers on questions of strategy, or who complained that other organizers had taken stands in the popular media without consultation. This is evidence of the most basic obstacle to effective deliberation in the food bank community: the lack of fora in which deliberations over questions of strategy can take place. Some initiatives undertaken by food bank organizers in an effort to build a space for discussions were noted earlier. It does seem evident, however, that despite all of these initiatives, the channels of communication within the food bank community were still very weak.
This should not be surprising, because the food bank community faced particularly severe obstacles in its attempt to build spaces for deliberation. First, the construction of such fora takes time and energy, and the food bank community has few slack resources to spare for such activities. The task is also aggravated by the fact that constituents of the community are widely dispersed and work irregular hours; these two considerations make it particularly difficult to build up regular channels for communication.
Turnover among volunteers probably also aggravates the situation as conversations about strategy are suddenly closed off, and begun anew.
Ambivalence about Deliberation
Another major obstacle to deliberation within the food bank community is ambivalence about the value of deliberation itself. While it is true that leaders of the food bank community have invested a significant amount of energy into the creation of opportunities for deliberation, there is also a strong tendency to deny the importance of such work, and to characterize discussion as a waste of time. The attitude is evident in one commentator's complaint that debate on the "shutdown issue . . . squanders precious energy and gets nowhere." 57 Of course, it is true there must be a limit to deliberation, and that a loosely-structured discussion may "go nowhere," but there are also other explanations of why individuals in the food bank community may take a critical view of deliberation. It may be that their thinking is still dominated by the older paradigms, in which deliberation would indeed be regarded as inefficient.
Rhetorical Demands on Community Leaders
There are other reasons why food bank managers may not want to foster deliberation within the their own agencies. One of the main tasks confronting these leaders is persuading many individuals outside the community --notably individual and corporate donors --to contribute money or food to the food bank system, and this rhetorical requirement 58 may be more easily fulfilled if an impression of consensus within the organization can be maintained. If there is seen to be controversy within the food bank community about the effectiveness of the emergency food relief strategy, donations of food might fall off; and this is a difficult problem when demand already far exceeds supply. This problem was raised by the Hamilton-Wentworth Food and Shelter Advisory Committee during a discussion of the "shutdown issue" in legislative hearings. "We do not agree that food banks should threaten to close their doors at some stated time in the foreseeable future," the Committee said, "[because] it could mislead public and corporate donors into believing that their help is no longer wanted or needed." 59 Of course, we can also imagine the obverse of this situation: a food bank that is reluctant to give space for internal deliberations over the shutdown issue because it wants to make the threat of a shutdown more credible to the government.
Similar constraints were imposed on the food bank community because of its desire to present a united front when lobbying government on policies affecting the food bank system. There is a widespread perception in the community that it will be more effective in influencing government policy if it speaks with one voice. This perception is probably accurate. It probably would have been more difficult for the provincial government to renew funding to food banks in December, 1990 if none had spoken in favor of it: as it was, the government relied on the fact that there were "differing views" among food banks to defend the reasonableness of its policy. 60 In an effort to maintain the impression of a united front, leaders in the food bank community took two steps that impaired the quality of deliberation within the community. One approach is to deny that leaders within the food bank community do have significant differences of opinion about strategy, or to manage those differences in a way that is out of the public eye. In public, for example, the Director of Toronto's Daily Bread Food Bank, Gerard Kennedy, denied that he had significant differences with the Director of the London Food Bank, Glen Pearson, the chairperson of the Ontario Association of Food Banks (OAFB) on questions of strategy.
But there were, in fact, serious disagreements between the two on the issue of institutionalization, fueled recently by the London Food Bank's support of "good samaritan" legislation, to which Kennedy was solidly opposed. 61
The food bank community had good reason to downplay these differences, because they would complicate the task of lobbying government; on the other hand, such tactics also make it difficult for the food bank community as a whole to have a productive conversation about the problem of institutionalization.
Another approach, which helps to maintain an impression of solidarity but which diminishes the community's capacity to deliberate on strategy, is to discredit dissenting voices within the community. This is somewhat different than denying that there is disagreement on important questions; in this case food bank leaders concede the fact of dissent, but offer reasons why it should not be taken seriously. The tactic was employed by some food bank leaders during the 1990 debate over whether the government should continue its financing of food banks. In conversation, some food bank organizers said that the community was generally opposed to renewal of funding, except for one or two "cashstarved" food banks who had "forgotten their principles." A review of submissions to the 1990 legislative hearings produced quite a different picture: for example, almost the whole of the Ottawa food bank community was opposed to the termination of funding, and had good reason for holding that position. 62 The denial that there was reasoned dissent against the majority position had tactical advantages, so far as lobbying government was concerned; but it again made it more difficult for the community to have a productive discussion on the subject, particularly because it eroded the mutual respect that was essential for the conversation to continue.
Lack of Practice in Deliberation
It may also be the case that the tactic of attributing base motives to competing views arises out of pure habit than out of strategic considerations, such as the desire to present a united front to government. In the food bank community, as anywhere else, it is possible to find individuals attributing base motives, such as the desire to "expand turf" or "build an empire," even where more reasonable and equally plausible explanations for a person's conduct may be available.
Why is this done? The explanation may be that we simply do not appreciate the long-term damage which this sort of argument may do. As Peter Senge observes, the capacity to engage in dialogue is not something that is nurtured in our society, and as a consequence it should not be surprising that it is very often done poorly. 63 Perhaps if we were more careful about our choice of methods of argumentation, and conscious of the long-term damage that can be done by ad hominem assaults, we would resort to them less frequently. 64
Individuals within the food bank community may also lack practice in shifting from advocacy of a particular position to deliberation about the wisdom of that position. Food bank organizers spent a good deal of time attempting to persuade groups outside the food bank community --corporate donors, individual donors, the media, governments --to support their work. To be effective in this sort of advocacy, organizers needed to downplay their own doubts about the reasonableness of that work. It is probably difficult for organizers to "shift gears" for deliberations within the food bank community, by moving away from active advocacy of a position and opening oneself to arguments about its reasonableness. 65
"Moral Absolutism" and Dread
Deliberation may also be impeded by "moral absolutism" --the practice of framing one's own position on a question of strategy as a "matter of principle," and of denying the possibility that such principles can be compromised. From the point of view of practical reasoning, moral absolutism has two defects: the assumption that only one technology can accomplish certain moral goals, and the assumption that such goals can work at cross purposes, so that the pursuit of one worthy objective might compromise another. Moral absolutism is, however, a common problem in deliberation, in part as a tactic in advocative work and in part because of lack of practice in reasoning through ethical dilemmas. It also has a corrosive effect on deliberation, because it denies the element of doubt, without which it is impossible for a conversation about the wisdom of alternative positions to proceed. 66
It would be interesting to investigate whether moral absolutism is aggravated by workload-induced stress or dread of making the wrong decision. The tendency of such factors to induce "cognitive rigidity" in decision-makers has been well-documented. 67 We can easily imagine that dread of choosing a strategy that does harm to the clientele might be particularly severe in the food bank community, precisely because it is largely a voluntary sector in altruism --the desire to do good for others --is the main motivator. As Robert Wuthnow observes, The voluntary sector is a protected zone, the last bastion of our highest hopes and aspirations. . . .
[W]e want it to be pure, like motherhood and apple pie, as a reminder and a preserver of goodness and decency. 68
Given the heavy weight which we put on right conduct in this sector, we should not be surprised to find a high degree of dread about strategic missteps; and perhaps we should not be surprised to find individuals responding to this dread by blocking out contrary evidence and asserting one position with greater energy than it deserves.
CONCLUSION
The most basic point to be emphasized is that we have too often relied on a misconception of how individuals in organizations respond to situations of moral and technical uncertainty. We have not yet adequately recognized that the first response of an individual who is confronted with the need to make a decision in the face of such uncertainties is to consult with others about that decision; and that the first response of a community that is confronted with such decisions is to initiate a broad debate about them. We try to manage our problems through talk, not just solitary analysis. This conversation becomes the vehicle by which we acquire the capacity to make difficult decisions with some assurance that the choices we make are reasonable ones. This basic point is too often overlooked, primarily because we have relied on two "conceptual lenses" --the machine paradigm and game paradigm --which encourage us to regard the interaction of individuals within a community in much cruder terms.
The influence of the game paradigm is particularly unfortunate. Its assumption that collective activity can be adequately described as bargaining between tactically-minded players with well-defined goals is very often wrong. It misses the fact that individuals often do not know what their goals should be, or do not know how to accomplish those goals, and that individuals often try to solve these problems by talking them through with other individuals. Interaction within collectivities such as the food bank community is richer, and less hostile, than the game paradigm would suggest.
Furthermore, the game paradigm leads us to an incomplete understanding of the managerial function. Managers must do more than acquire and deploy power in the pursuit of their own goals. Certainly an attempt to characterize the activity of leaders in the food bank community in these terms would be woefully inadequate. As the practice of these leaders suggests, the managerial function also includes the responsibility of building fora in which individuals can talk to one another about complex problems, and the responsibility of managing conversation within those fora. These are not easy tasks. Although individuals in the food bank community are naturally driven to deliberate with one another about their problems, there are also substantial obstacles which may impair those deliberations, and which constrain food bank leaders in their attempt to cultivate those deliberations.
The assembly paradigm provides a fuller understanding of the character of organizational life by focussing greater attention on deliberation within a collectivity. There is no doubt that the root metaphor upon which it relies --the identification of collectivities with assemblies --has its own deficiencies. Perhaps its assumption about the distribution of power within a collectivity is too naïve, and perhaps it is most useful when we seek to characterize life in collectivities that rely on threshold strategies, or during periods of strategic change. Some restraint in using this new metaphor is well-advised. But this is equally true of the metaphor implicit in the game paradigm, and thus of much of our current thinking about the job of management.
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